Iran’s Military-Electoral Quagmire

Arseh Sevom – Over the years, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij have become increasingly active in the political sphere, interfering with the operation of free and fair elections with increasing prevalence. Under the guise of protecting the revolution, they have subverted electoral law with impunity. With each election, their meddling has become more brazen and less furtive. Despite a mandate to operate outside of politics and a dressing down from the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, the armed forces of Iran — in particular the IRGC and Basij — now make up a parallel government that works to control and subvert the democratic process. In the article, Mohammad Reza Sardari presents an overview of the growing influence of Iran’s armed forces. This article is translated from Persian. The original can be found here: http://www.arsehsevom.org/archives/1798.

by Mohammad Reza Sardari

The intervention of armed forces in the election process of the Islamic Republic of Iran can be traced back to its early days in the 1980s, materializing after the establishment of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an armed organization parallel to the regular army with the mission of guarding the Islamic Revolution. In 2007 the Basij-e Mostaz’afin (literally “Mobilization of the Oppressed”), established in 1979 as a paramilitary force, came under the supervision of the IRGC. Both are directly controlled by the Supreme Leader. Unlike the regular army, both the IRGC and Basij have always interfered in elections despite the fact that there is no law giving them authority to do so.  The only role for any armed force is to provide security, which is the responsibility of the police. Furthermore, rules and regulations, as well as recommendations made by Ayatollah Khomeini, clearly prevent military forces from interfering in elections and in politics, banning membership in political parties and campaigning.

Prohibitions Against Military Intervention in Elections

According to election laws, police and military forces, armed or not, are prohibited from any interference in arranging and supervising elections (article 24 of Presidential Election Law and article 16 of Parliamentary Election Law).

Military forces do not have the right to participate in any electoral process: from campaigning to vote counting to macro-level processes such as the management of elections. Furthermore, military forces and intelligence officials are prohibited from serving as representatives of candidates at polling stations stations. Additionally, according to article 40 of the Armed Forces Penal Code, any participation, intervention, or activity of armed forces officials at rallies, in political disputes, or campaigning is forbidden, punished by from six months to three years of imprisonment.

Article 49 of the Disciplinary Bylaws of the Armed Forces mentions the following prohibitions:

• Using resources of the IRGC in favor of or against political parties, groups, assemblies, or presidential candidates
• Arranging any meeting, assembly, or speech in favor of or against any political party, group, or presidential candidate
• Inviting officials and members of political groups or electoral candidates to the centers of the IRGC
• Campaigning in favor of or against political parties, groups, assemblies, or electoral candidates; distributing, installing, or removing announcements, photos, or posters of candidates and parties; and distributing cassette tapes, CDs, or other materials by either the IRGC or Basij
• Intervening in elections by participating in observatory activities or membership in supervisory or executive bodies, without making arrangements and obtaining permits from the organization
• Interfering in the activities of polling stations and imposing personal judgments on their affairs
• Creating chaos, disturbing speeches, misusing rank or position in order to threaten parties and candidates, or encouraging people in favor of or against any party or candidate
• Making any comment in favor of or against candidates by members of IRGC or Basij who are responsible for protecting polling boxes
• Collecting signatures or letters in favor of or against political parties, groups, or candidates
• Installing photos, banners, posters, or announcements of political parties, groups, or candidates in IRGC and Basij centers or on their vehicles
• Interfering in the political activities of parties or candidates, plans, or campaigns, including participation at conferences, public, and private meetings, taking part in activities of electoral campaigns, promoting political parties or candidates in their publications.

The IRGC’s statutes prohibit its members from participating in political and partisan affairs. According to article 47 of the same statute:

“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps politically and ideologically follow the commands of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih). This foundation is autonomous from all political parties and groups and should never act as a political party or organization.” 

In addition, according to article 1 of the Armed Forces Penal Code, approved in 2003, the following individuals should be considered military forces:

• General staff of Iranian Armed Forces and affiliated organizations
• The staff of the Iranian military and affiliated organizations
• The staff of the IRGC, affiliated organizations, and Basij
• Iranian Ministry of Defense and affiliated organizations and staff
• The staff of Iranian organizations subject to armed forces laws
• Those currently in military service
• Those who study in educational centers of armed forces both domestic and abroad, or who study in educational centers of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
• Temporary members of the armed forces who are, according to the law, considered members of the forces during their service period

Although these rules and regulations are brief, they provide more than enough substantiation for the prohibition against military forces interfering in elections.

Meddling of Basij and IRGC in Elections

In spite of all the rules and regulations, many politicians have noted the interference of members of the Basij and IRGC in elections. The founder of the Islamic state, Ayatollah Khomeini, himself made just such an accusation. In a speech in honor of Imam Reza’s birthday, Khomeini stated:

“Members of the Revolutionary Guard Corps are not allowed to participate in political affairs or support groups or parties. What goes on in the parliament or elections is not your business. I have been informed that some members of the IRGC still interfere in the process. Elections are being held elsewhere and it does not have anything to do with the members of the IRGC. Members of IRGC are not allowed to interfere, members of the military are not allowed to interfere…”. (ref. to Ahang-e Rah website, Seyed Mohammad Mousavi KHooeiniha)

Khomeini’s speech concerned parliamentary elections and clearly shows that interference in political affairs was so intense even then that he was forced to react. This speech was made during the restrictive political atmosphere during the 1980s when the Iran-Iraq war was overshadowing all other concerns.

Even so, the habit of interference could not be broken and the following decade witnessed the widespread interference of military forces in elections. In the second round of the fifth parliamentary elections, the Kargozaran (Construction Party) — currently led by Mohammad-Ali Najafi — which has been affiliated with former President  Rafsanjani, was labeled “liberal” by its opponents. In a command, Mohsen Rezaei, the IRGC Chief Commander at the time, stated:

“We should participate in the second round and cast our votes to avoid having liberals in the parliament making trouble for the nation and country.” (Kayhan, 17 April 1996)

Ironically, in 2009, Rezaei ran for president, finding himself on the receiving end of political interference.  He initially objected to the results of the elections, but eventually retracted those objections. He intends to run for this year’s election as well. It was his statement in 1996 that marked the start of the IRGC’s overt and organized participation in elections.

From Covert to Overt

The IRGC’s role in elections had been more discreet during Khatami’s first term. During the second term, the IRGC and Basij entered the election scene in a new and organized manner with a project the called called “the insight plan” (Tarh-e Basirat). The groups planned organized trainings for their members, obliging them to collect at least ten votes from families and relatives. Political-ideological activities were organized through a plan called “Political Guides of the IRGC” (Hadian-e Siasi-e Sepah). On Election Day, the IRGC had covert control of vote counting and computer sites, even observers from the Ministry of Interior were not allowed to be present in vote counting stations.

After that the interference of military forces entered a new stage: using members of the Basij as observers of the Guardian Council. In spite of obvious disagreement from the Ministry of Interior, the Guardian Council established observation offices in all provinces and mobilized its members from the Basij forces to serve the dual purposes of conducting local investigations on candidates in order to assess their conformity with the Council’s criteria, and being present at poll stations (more than ten members were present in some polling stations).

After the election, a number of parliamentarians warned against the interference of the IRGC in elections. One such figure was Behzad Nabavi, deputy speaker of the parliament, who revealed the role of the Saralah Military Camp and Intelligence Office of the IRGC in past elections.

Interfering with Impunity

The IRGC’s role was becoming more and more apparent in the elections. During the ninth presidential elections (2005) resulting in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s victory, the military forces had a widespread presence, marking the first elections explicity engineered by the IRGC.

The IRGC had a candidate (Ahmadinejad) and a strategy for that election, providing all the logistics. The observation body of the Ministry of Interior prepared a detailed and unpublished report on the interference of the IRGC in the election. Former speaker of the parliament Mehdi Karroubi and former Interior Minister Mostafa Moein were among those who brought attention to the direct role of the IRGC in elections. In his press conference on the Saturday afternoon following the election, Mehdi Karroubi said:

“I believe the election was invalid after the interference of a number of IRGC and Basij members and ask the Supreme Leader to appoint a body to investigate the issue…I felt that a number of IRGC and Basij members were engaged in activities just a couple of days before the election, but the activities were mostly focused on another candidate. I warned against the possibility that, in spite of Imam Khomeini’s words, armed forces do interfere in elections and cause events like those we see in some other countries.”

Mostafa Moein wrote a statement saying that in the final days of the election “an absolute will” for “victory of a specific candidate” became apparent and “prepared the ground for interference by military organizations…” His spokeswoman Elaheh Koulaei read the statement at a meeting of the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jebheye Mosharekate Irane Eslaami) and said that “a military and paramilitary process” had affected the results of the election. At that time, Khatami’s administration was the monitoring body and was organizing its last election.

Militarizing the Electoral Process

The sixth parliamentary election, held under the administration of Ahmadinejad, was a fully militarized election. The former Basij Chief of Staff, Commander Afshar, was the head of the National Election Taskforce (Elections Control Room) at the time of the elections. The election marked a competition between supporters of the government and the current bunch running the parliament today: a purely military competition.

However, the tenth presidential election (2009) witnessed the highest level of engineering by the IRGC, causing a number of analysts to argue that it was an election coup. The Supreme Leader planned to reappoint Ahmadinejad for a second term so the IRGC entered the election scene in full force.

This strategy was designed to mitigate the risk of reformists taking office, knowing they enjoy a majority among the electorate. Later, Commander Moshfegh, head of Saralah Military Camp, confessed the direct role of the IRGC in the election.

Subverting the Democratic Process

A report published by Mir Hossein Mousavi’s camp provides a number of examples of interference by the IRGC and Basij during the election. It documents the Supreme Leader’s role in enabling IRGC support of Ahmadinejad.

The report stated:

“Flyers of Ansar-e Hezbollah were distributed among military forces and personnel of the IRGC and Basij. According to these flyers, Commander Pakpour reported the  opinion of the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, Hojatoleslam Saidi, about the upcoming presidential elections. Saeidi responded: ‘The clear choice of the Supreme Leader is to reappoint President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Commanders of IRGC are obligated to make their personnel, especially those on conscription, understand the guidelines presented by the Supreme Leader.’”

These statements not only violated the laws on military interference in elections, but also paved the way for the IRGC and Basij to obstruct the elections in a variety of ways. This included using the resources of the IRGC and police for Ahmadinejad’s campaign, arranging meetings and conferences for him, and smearing Mir Hossein Mousavi as a threat to the country. All were clear violations of electoral laws.

Fears of Velvet Revolution

Analyses made by the IRGC resulted in claims of foreign intervention in the campaigns of Ahmadinejad opponents Mousavi and Karoubi. According to them, the candidates were being influenced to bring about a “soft” or “velvet” revolution. (Reference to Mr. Saidi’s speech, cited in Weekly Political Analysis, Political Deputy of the IRGC).

The daily newsletter published by the Office of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC combined news from newspapers such as Kayhan, Javan, and Iran to support Ahmadinejad and accuse his opponents of giving assistance to groups and parties that do not believe in the regime.

Violations During the 2009 Presidential Elections

Among violations of the law committed by the police, IRGC and Basij, are the following:

• Ripping down advertisements of Ahmadinejad’s competitors, attacking their staff, threatening them and disrupting their plans, collecting birth certificates of those who served their military service in a number of military camps, distributing handbooks and guidelines in favor of Ahmadinejad and against Mousavi.
• Making extensive arrangements and mobilizing tens of thousands plainclothes members of the Basij in Ahmadinejad’s campaigns in Tehran Musalla and sometimes even paying the members for their services.
• Illegal actions of police, plainclothes forces, IRGC, and Basij on Election Day, including campaigning for Ahmadinejad at polling stations, forcing voters to vote for Ahmadinejad, intimidation at many stations and villages, casting votes on behalf of others by members of Basij, showing membership cards by members of Basij in order to avoid having their ids stamped [which is how voting is controlled], interference in operations of polling stations.
• Illegal actions by the police, plainclothes forces, IRGC, and Basij included attacking Mousavi’s campaign staff in Qeitarieh, arresting the members of the campaign, and attacking the headquarters of Mousavi’s camp in order to destroy evidence of election violations.

No One Can Stop After Just One Taste of Power

The intervention of military forces didn’t end with their success during the 2009 election. Activities continued during the ninth parliamentary election despite the fact that many opposition figures were already disqualified from even running.

Given the tensions between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei during this election, the IRGC tried not to allow the administration to affect the results. Many commanders of the IRGC hand-picked candidates, doing their best to eliminate any competition.

In Rasht, for example, the former Governor General of Gilan Province, ran for the election and was disqualified. Such examples could be seen in many cities, showing the dominance of the IRGC on the elections.

The MP Ali Motahari was one of the few who openly spoke out against the meddling, invoking the anger of the IRGC which threatened him with a lawsuit if he persisted in speaking out.

Justifying a Military Role in Elections and Governance

Major General Jafari, commander of the IRGC, argued that the Corps is not simply military, claiming that the IRGC is more a security-political organization that should not be limited to military defense of the Islamic Revolution. Justifying the role of the Basij in the 2009 elections, he stated:

“The section of the Basij that does not serve military purposes should not be considered as a branch of the armed forces. This section is allowed to participate in political affairs in order to protect the Islamic Revolution. This section can even take part in presidential elections.”

Hojatoleslam Saidi, the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, also emphasized the role of IRGC in elections, arguing that the Corps is not indifferent in presidential elections. He stated that the IRGC should engineer elections in order to prevent those who have troubles with the Supreme Leader from taking office. He once said:

“The IRGC has a polling box and should determine criteria. We want a president who follows the commands of the Supreme Leader. Our criteria are adherence to the values of the revolution, loyalty to the Supreme Leader, and expert management skills.”

He added that members of city councils, village councils and parliament all need to be in line with orders of the Supreme Leader. He clearly stated:

“Our votes in parliament, city councils, and village councils are celestial only when elected candidates are followers of the Supreme Leader.”

Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of Basij, also argued that elected candidates should conform to the Supreme Leader’s orders. According to him, it is responsibility of the Basij to determine the criteria for what makes a good candidate rather:

“The Basij’s approach in the next elections should be to provide insight for people to enable them to choose the best candidate…”

Major General Firouzabadi, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, is yet another military figure who advocates for interference in elections. In the last presidential election, his statements supporting Ahmadinejad and comments on setting age criteria for candidates are a matter of public record.

In addition, many other IRGC and Basij commanders at local and district levels have made similar statements.

Organization and Mobilization of the IRGC 

General Jafari was right to say that the IRGC is more than a military organization. It is also a political, economic, security, and cultural institution. The trace of such categories can also be seen in IRGC’s structure.

The Corps is an institution parallel to the government that interferes not only in elections, but also in all other state affairs, despite the fact that this contradicts the ideology and expressed concerns of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini. The IRGC was born in his era and continued developing after him until becoming a de facto parallel government. It now wields even more executive power than the government.

In reality, the IRGC plays a special protective role for the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader. The late Ayatollah Montazeri once said that since the very beginning Ayatollah Khamenei believed that “the IRGC should be like a ring on the fingers of the Islamic Republic Party.” (Reference to the Islamic Republic Party which was established in the early days of the 1979 revolution and later dissolved in the mid 80s.)

But how does the IRGC engineer and influence elections? They act based on the country’s political situation, candidate participation, and the type of the elections. Given the diversity and geographical dispersal of candidates, activities of the Corps are not centralized in parliamentary elections. The basic principle is to have a parliament with a majority of MPs who are unquestioning followers of the Supreme Leader.

Let the Right One In

The IRGC’s activities can be classified into two categories:

The first category is its security and intelligence activities and identification of the candidates in cooperation with the Guardian Council and Ministry of Intelligence. Although the IRGC’s role is covert, final decisions are usually made in operation rooms similar to those we see in a war situation. If there is no serious competitor for their desired candidates and no cost of [politically] eliminating an opposing candidate, the appointed candidate is in fact a member of parliament before the elections even take place.

However, if the constituency contains several candidates, the Corps goes to the second phase of its operation and uses its members, including members of the Basij, to select the candidate most in line with the position of the Supreme Leader. They use methods such as buying or directing votes. These methods require trainings which have already been offered to the members through general camps.

The IRGC’s operation is different when it comes to presidential elections. Unlike parliamentary elections, the IRGC’s role is more prominent. Directing votes, sabotaging the activities of competitors, and even engineering the vote counting process are among the methods the IRGC uses. Activities of the “political guides” of the IRGC (whose members mostly consist of clerics) under the supervision of the Supreme Leader’s representative, the establishment of special camps for elections with the excuse of providing training for security, the distribution of flyers among IRGC and Basij members, surveillance of the activities of competitors, and security encounters, if necessary, are methods commonly used by the Corps in presidential elections.

Final words

The presence of the powerful military institution of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and its dominance over the electoral process makes it impossible to conduct a free election. The highest authorities of this gigantic organization have shown in word and deed that even members of village councils should unquestioningly follow the orders of the Supreme Leader. The IRGC has gone even further and interfered in elections of non-governmental organizations such as Iran’s Physicians’ Association. Therefore, it can be concluded that although military forces are clearly prohibited to interfere in elections according to the law, the electoral system is dominated by their interventions, making it impossible to have free elections.

About the author

Mohammad Reza Sardari is an expert on elections and political groups and has held positions in Iran’s Interior Ministry, serving as the head of department on political groups from 2000-2004. In addition, he has experience working with NGOs and international organizations on issues related to immigration and refugees.

Sardari began a career as a journalist in 1997, writing for Shargh and a number of other newspapers in Iran. Recently he has written for for Jaras, Rooz Online, and Tehran Review.

Sardari studied political science and international law in Iran.

Translated by: Peyman Majidzadeh